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Abstract—Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) suffer from sensor
drifts in GPS denied environments, which can lead to potentially
dangerous situations. To avoid intolerable sensor drifts in the
presence of GPS spoofing attacks, we propose a safety constrained
control framework that adapts the UAV at a path re-planning
level to support resilient state estimation against GPS spoofing
attacks. The proposed framework includes an attack detector, a
resilient state estimator, a robust controller, an attacker location
tracker (ALT), and an escape controller (ESC). The attack
detector is used to detect GPS spoofing attacks based on the
resilient state estimation and provides a switching criterion
between the robust control mode and emergency control mode.
The robust control mode is on when the GPS is free of attacks.
When the GPS spoofing attack is detected, the state estimator
only utilizes IMU signals since GPS signals do not contain
legitimate information. To quantify the sensor drift due to limited
sensor availability, we use the escape time which is defined as a
safe time under which the state estimation error remains within
a tolerable error with designated confidence. ALT is developed to
track the location of the attacker and estimate the output power
of the spoofing device by the unscented Kalman filter (UKF) with
sliding window outputs. Using the estimates from ALT, ESC is
designed based on the constrained model predictive controller
(MPC) such that the UAV escapes from the effective range of the
spoofing device within the escape time. The numerical simulations
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed resilient safety
constrained control framework.
Index Terms—State estimation, Stochastic systems, Unmanned
aerial vehicles
I. INTRODUCTION
UAVs have been used across the world for commercial,
civilian, as well as educational applications over the decades.
The mechanical simplicity and agile maneuverability appeal
to many applications, such as cargo transportation [1], aerial
photography [2], and agricultural farming [3]. The most widely
used sensor for UAVs is the global positioning system (GPS),
which offers accurate and reliable state measurements. How-
ever, GPS receivers are vulnerable to various types of attacks,
such as blocking, jamming, and spoofing [4]. The Vulnerability
Assessment Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory has
demonstrated that the civilian GPS spoofing attacks can be
easily implemented by using GPS simulator [5]. Furthermore,
GPS is more vulnerable when its signal strength is weak. In
particular, due to various applications of UAVs, the operating
environment becomes diverse as well, where GPS signals
are weak or even denied due to other structures such as
skyscrapers, elevated highways, bridges, and mountains.
Literature review. One of the GPS spoofing attack detection
techniques is to analyze raw antenna signals or utilize multi-
antenna receiver systems. The GPS spoofing attack can be
detected by checking whether the default radiation pattern is
changed in [6]. A multi-antenna receiver system was used
to detect GPS spoofing attacks by monitoring the angle-of-
arrival of the spoofing attempts in [7]. As an extension of this
work, the GPS spoofing mitigation has also been investigated
where an array of antennas is utilized to obtain genuine
GPS signals by spatial filtering (steering beams/nulls) [8]–
[10]. However, those solutions usually require modifications
of the hardware or the low-level computing modules and
assume that an attacker can only use single-antenna spoofing
systems. Furthermore, the attacker can spoof the GPS receivers
without being detected if multi-antenna spoofing devices are
available [11].
In CPS security literature, GPS spoofing attacks have been
described as a malicious signal injection to the genuine sensor
output [12]. Attack detection against malicious signal injection
has been widely studied over the last few years. The attack
detection problem has been formulated as an `0/`∞ optimiza-
tion problem, which is non-deterministic polynomial-time hard
(NP-hard) in [13], [14]. The fundamental limitations of struc-
tural detectability, as well as graph-theoretical detectability for
linear time invariant systems have been studied in [15], where
distributed attack detection has also been studied. The attack
detection problem has been formulated as an attack-resilient
estimation problem of constrained state and unknown input
in [16]. A switching mode resilient detection and estimation
framework for GPS spoofing attacks has been studied in [17].
Attack detection using multiple GPS signals by checking
cross-correlation was introduced in [18]. In [19], the maximum
deviations of the state were identified due to the sensor
attacks while remaining stealthy due to the detection. There
have been efforts to design a resilient control architecture.
A secure control framework for networked control systems
is designed to analyze the resource-limited adversaries [20].
Existing emergency control architectures focus on switching
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control from a high-performance controller to a robust high-
assurance controller in the presence of attacks [21]. These
architectures can efficiently handle a class of attacks, but can-
not address the fundamental problem originated from limited
sensor availability in the presence of cyber-attacks.
Contribution. The current paper addresses safety problems
induced by limited sensor availability due to GPS spoofing
attacks. We formulate the sensor drift problem as an increasing
variance of state estimation to quantify the sensor drift and
introduce escape time under which the state estimation error
remains within a tolerable error with high confidence. We
develop a novel safety constrained control framework that
adapts the UAV at a path re-planning level to support resilient
state estimation against GPS spoofing attacks. The framework
consists of an attack detector, a resilient state estimator, a
robust controller, an attacker location tracker (ALT) and, an
escape controller (ESC). In the presence of the GPS spoofing
attack, ALT tracks the attacker’s location and estimates the
output power of the spoofing device by UKF with sliding
window outputs. The estimates are then used in ESC which
drives the UAVs away from the effective range of the spoofing
device within the escape time to avoid intolerable sensor drift.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, we introduce the notation convention in our paper
and the dynamic system model. In the same section, we
formulate the problem. In Section III, we propose a resilient
safety constrained control framework. In Section IV, a nu-
merical simulation of a UAV under the GPS spoofing attack
is presented.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section discusses the necessary notation, system model,
and the problem statement.
A. Notation
We use the subscript k of xk to denote the time index; Rn
denotes the n-dimensional Euclidean space; Rn+ denotes the
set of positive elements in the n-dimensional Euclidean space;
Rn×m denotes the set of all n ×m real matrices; A> A−1,
diag(A) and tr(A) denote the transpose, inverse, diagonal and
trace of matrix A, respectively; I denotes the identity matrix
with an appropriate dimension; ‖ · ‖ denotes the standard
Euclidean norm for vector or an induced matrix norm; × is
used to denote matrix multiplication when the multiplied terms
are in different lines; E[ · ] denotes the expectation operator;
P( · ) denotes the probability operator. For a symmetric matrix
S, S > 0 and S ≥ 0 indicate that S is positive definite and
positive semi-definite, respectively. Finally, for a vector x and
a matrix P , (x)i and (P )i denote the ith row of the vector x
and the matrix P .
B. System Model
Consider the discrete-time dynamic system model:
xk = Axk−1 +Buk−1 + wk−1 (1a)
yGk = C
Gxk + dk + v
G
k (1b)
yIk = C
I(xk − xk−1) + vIk (1c)
ySk =

CS ηkd(xak,xk)2
+ vSk , under the attack
ηS + vSk , otherwise ,
(1d)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state, and A, B, CG, CI and CS are
proper sized matrices. There are three types of outputs avail-
able. Output yGk ∈ RmG is the GPS measurement which may
be corrupted by unknown GPS spoofing signal dk ∈ RmG .
Output yIk ∈ RmI is the IMU measurement which returns a
noisy measurement of the state difference. Output ySk ∈ RmS
represents the GPS signal strength. If GPS is under the attack,
it is an inverse function of the distance between the attacker
and UAV, where xak ∈ Rn is the unknown attacker location,
and ηk ∈ RmS is the nominal power of the spoofing device.
The function d(a, b) measures the Euclidean distance between
a and b. If the UAV receives genuine GPS signals, this output
represents the genuine GPS signal strength ηS . We assume
that the attacker can inject any signal dk into yGk .
The noise signals wk, vGk , v
I
k, and v
S
k are assumed to be in-
dependent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random
variables with zero means and covariances E[wkw>k ] = Σw ≥
0, E[vGk (vGk )>] = ΣG > 0, E[v
I
k(v
I
k)
>] = ΣI > 0, and
E[vSk (vSk )>] = ΣS > 0, respectively.
Remark 2.1: The sensor measurement yIk represents any
relative sensor measurement, such as velocity measurement
by a camera. In this paper, we use IMU for the illustration.
Remark 2.2: The signal strength output ySk in (1d) is
derived by the GPS signal attenuation due to free-space path
loss. Friis transmission equation [22] is given by:
Pr = PtGtGr
λ2
(4pir)2
,
where Pt and Pr are the transmit power and the receive power;
Gt and Gr are the transmit and receive antenna gains; r is the
distance between two antennas; λ is the wavelength. We write
Gr(
λ
4pi )
2 as the output matrix CS ; GtPt as the nominal power
of the spoofing device ηk; and r as the distance between the
spoofing device and UAV d(xak, xk) in (1d).
C. Problem Statement
Given the system (1) with sensor measurements (GPS, IMU,
and GPS signal strength), the defender aims to detect the
GPS spoofing attack; achieve attack-resilient state estimation
when considering the limited sensor availability, i.e., aims to
have the estimation errors within a tolerable bound with a
predetermined significance level; complete the global mission
securely.
III. SAFETY CONSTRAINED CONTROL FRAMEWORK
To address the problem described in Section II-C, we
propose a safety constrained control framework in Figure 1,
which consists of an attack detector, a resilient state estimator,
a robust controller, an attacker location tracker (ALT), and
an escape controller (ESC). The proposed safety constrained
control framework drives the UAV to the outside of the
effective range of the spoofing device. The following explains
each module in the proposed framework as shown in Figure 1.
Robust control mode. The robust controller is a complex
controller that operates the UAV to the destination in the
presence of noise, but without the presence of attacks. Any
robust/optimal control technique can be implemented to this
module.
Emergency control mode. ALT is designed for tracking the
location of the attacker and estimating the output power of
the spoofing device by applying UKF with sliding window
outputs. ESC is an MPC-based controller that drives the UAV
out of the effective range of the spoofing device within the
escape time based on the estimation of the attacker location
obtained by ALT.
Attack-resilient monitor & Decision logic. The resilient state
estimator is developed based on the Kalman-filter like state
estimator. The attack detector is designed by the χ2-based
anomaly detection algorithm. Based on the previous estimation
from the resilient state estimator, the Boolean output of the
attack detector determines i) whether the GPS measurement
should be used for the state estimation and ii) the switching
rule between two control modes: the robust control mode and
the emergency control mode.
Fig. 1: A safety constrained control framework consisting of an
attack detector, a resilient state estimator, a robust controller,
an attacker location tracker (ALT), an escape controller (ESC).
ALT and ESC adapt the UAV at a path re-planning level
for safe operation. In what follows, each subsection describes
the details of the corresponding component.
A. Resilient State Estimator
The defender implements an estimator and χ2 detector to
estimate the state and detect the GPS spoofing attack. The
following Kalman-filter like state estimator is used to estimate
the current state:
xˆk = Axˆk−1 +Buk−1
+KGk (y
G
k − CG(Axˆk−1 +Buk−1)) (2)
+KIk(y
I
k − CI(Axˆk−1 +Buk−1 − xˆk−1))
Pk = (A−KkCA+KkDC)Pk−1
× (A−KkCA+KkDC)> (3)
+ (I −KkC)Σw(I −KkC)> +KkΣyK>k ,
where xˆk is the state estimate and Pk is the state estimation
error covariance at time k, and
Kk :=
[
KGk K
I
k
]
,
C :=
[
CG
CI
]
, Σy :=
[
ΣG 0
0 ΣI
]
, D :=
[
0 0
0 I
]
.
The optimal gain Kk, given by
Kk = (APk−1(CA−DC)> + ΣwC>)
× ((CA−DC)Pk−1(CA−DC)> + CΣwC> + Σy)−1 ,
(4)
is the solution of the unconstrained optimization problem
minKk tr (Pk).
In [17], it has been shown that the covariance in (3)
is bounded when the GPS signal is available. If the GPS
is denied, and only the relative sensor yIk is available, the
covariance is strictly increasing and unbounded in time. That
is, the sensor drift problem can be formulated as instability of
the covariance matrix.
B. Attack Detector
We conduct the χ2 statistic test to detect the GPS spoofing
attacks:
H0 : dk = 0;
H1 : dk 6= 0,
(5)
using CUSUM (CUmulative SUM) algorithm, which is widely
used in attack detection research [23]–[25].
Since dk = yGk −CGxk− vGk , given the previous state esti-
mate xˆk−1 by the state estimator, we estimate the attack vector
by comparing the sensor output and the output prediction:
dˆk = y
G
k − CG(Axˆk−1 +Buk−1). (6)
Note that the current estimate xˆk should not be used for the
prediction, because it is correlated with the current output; i.e.,
E[xˆk(yGk )>] 6= 0.
Due to the Gaussian noises wk and vk injected to the linear
system in (1), the states follow Gaussian distribution since
any finite linear combination of Gaussian distributions is also
Gaussian. Similarly, dˆk is Gaussian as well, and thus the use of
χ2 test (5) is justified1. In particular, the χ2 test compares the
normalized attack vector estimate dˆ>k (P
d
k )
−1dˆk with χ2df (α):
Accept H0, if dˆ>k (P
d
k )
−1dˆk ≤ χ2df (α)
Accept H1, if dˆ>k (P
d
k )
−1dˆk > χ2df (α),
(7)
where P dk := E[(dk − dˆk)(dk − dˆk)>] = CG(APk−1A> +
Σw)(C
G)> + ΣG, and χ2df (α) is the threshold found in the
Chi-square table. In χ2df (α), df denotes the degree of freedom,
and α denotes the statistical significance level.
To reduce the effect of noise, we use the test (7) in
a cumulative form. The proposed χ2 CUSUM detector is
characterized by the detector state Sk ∈ R+:
Sk = δSk−1 + (dˆk)>(P dk )
−1dˆk, S0 = 0, (8)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the pre-determined forgetting factor. At
each time k, the CUSUM detector (8) is used to update the
detector state Sk and detect the attack.
The attacker detector will i) update the estimated state xˆk
and the error covariance Pk in (3) with KGk = 0 and ii) switch
the control mode to emergency control mode, if
Sk >
∞∑
i=0
δiχ2df (α) =
χ2df (α)
1− δ , (9)
If Sk <
χ2df (α)
1−δ , then it returns to the robust control mode.
Remark 3.1: As shown in Figure 2, the resilient state esti-
mation uses the GPS measurement and the IMU measurement
to estimate the state by (2) for the detection purpose as in (6).
When the GPS attack is detected, only the IMU measurement
is used to estimate the state for the control purpose as in (2)
and (3) with KGk = 0.
C. Attacker Location Estimation (ALT)
We formulate the simultaneous estimation of the attacker
location xak and unknown parameter ηk as a target tracking
problem of the attacker state xak := [(x
a
k)
>, ηk]>.
Estimating the attacker state xak encounters two major
problems: i) the output equation ySk in (1d) is highly nonlinear,
and ii) a single measurement of the signal strength suffers
from the infinite number of solutions.
To address the first issue, we use the unscented Kalman
filter (UKF) [26], [27] which has been developed to deal with
highly nonlinear systems and provides a better estimation than
the extended Kalman filter. Motivated by the fact that locating
the epicenter of an earthquake can be done with at least three
measurements from different seismic stations, we resolve the
second issue by using sliding window outputs. To be specific,
1χ2 with k degree of freedom is the distribution of a sum of the squares
of k independent Gaussian random variables.
Fig. 2: State estimation outputs for detection and control.
GPS measurement and IMU measurement are used in the
estimator one (Est. 1). Estimator two (Est. 2) only uses the
IMU measurement. Est. 1 is used to estimate the state by (2)
for the detection purpose as in (6). When GPS is free of
attacks, Est. 1 is also used to estimate the state for the control
purpose since the GPS measurement is trustful. In the presence
of the GPS attack, Est. 2 is used for the control purpose.
we estimate xak+1 using UKF with N -sized sliding window
outputs:
xak+1 = x
a
k + w
a
k
ySk =

ySk
ySk−1
...
ySk−N+1
 (10)
The signal strength measurements from (1d) can be written as
ySk = f(x
a
k) + v
S
k , where f(·) := CS ηkd(xak,xk)2 .
The state estimation in (10) by UKF with sliding window
outputs can track the location of the moving attacker, while
nonlinear regression algorithms may fail to track it.
For completeness of the paper, the UKF with sliding
window outputs algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1 in
Appendix A with a brief derivation.
D. Escape Controller (ESC)
In the presence of the GPS spoofing attack, the variance
Pk in (3) of the state estimation errors is strictly increasing
and unbounded in time (Theorem 4.2 in [17]). The goal of
ESC is to drive the UAV outside of the effective range of
the spoofing device within the escape time so that the state
estimation error remains within the tolerable region with a
predetermined probability. The escape time is defined in [17]
as the following:
Definition 3.1: The escape time kesc ≥ 0 is the time
difference between the attack time ka and the first time
instance when the estimation error ‖xk − xˆk‖ is within the
tolerable error distance ζ ∈ Rn+ with the significance α, i.e.
kesc = arg min
k≥ka
k − ka
s.t. ζ>P−1k ζ < χ
2
df (α), (11)
where Pk is the error covariance of xk − xˆk, df is the degree
of freedom of the state.
It is worth to notice that the escape time kesc can be
calculated by Algorithm 1 in [17].
The escape time provides a new criterion for optimal trajec-
tory regeneration with increasing uncertainties. In particular,
the escape controller (ESC) is designed to drive the UAV
outside of the effective range of the spoofing device within
the escape time. At the time k, the problem can be formulated
as a finite horizon constrained MPC problem:
min
u
k+N∑
i=k
x˜>i+1Qix˜i+1 + u
>
i Riui (12a)
s.t. xi+1 = Axi +Bui + wi (12b)
d(xaka+kesc , xka+kesc)− reffect > 0 (12c)
h1(xi) ≤ 0 (12d)
h2(ui) ≤ 0 (12e)
for i = k, k + 1, · · · , k +N, (12f)
where N ≥ kesc is the prediction horizon, x˜i is defined as
the difference between the state and the goal state at time
index i, i.e., x˜i := xi − xgoali , Qi, Ri are symmetric positive
definite weight matrices, xˆai is the estimate of the attacker
location. Value reffect is the upper bound of the effective range
of the spoofing device, which is assumed to be known by
the UAV, since the nominal power of the spoofing device
ηk is bounded by the hardware constraint. In particular, the
constraint (12c) implies that ESC should drive the UAV
outside of the effective range of the spoofing device, i.e.,
d(xaka+kesc , xka+kesc) > reffect. Inequalities (12d) and (12e)
are any nonlinear constraints on the state xi (e.g., velocity)
and the control input ui (e.g., acceleration).
There are two key challenges for the MPC problem in (12)
that the states xk · · ·xk+N and the attacker’s position xaka+kesc
are unknown and their estimates are subject to stochastic noise.
Moreover, we cannot always guarantee that the program (12)
is feasible due to the constraint (12c); i.e., the UAV may not be
able to leave the effective range of the spoofing device within
the escape time.
To address the above issues, we approximate the MPC
problem (12) by the certainty equivalence principle and refor-
mulate the hard constraint (12c) to a soft constraint. Given the
estimations of UAV state xˆk and attacker state xˆak with their
covariances, we reformulate the problem (12) as the following:
min
u
k+N∑
i=k
ˆ˜x>i+1Qi ˆ˜xi+1 + u
>
i Riui +
k+N∑
i=ka+kesc
Urep(Di)
s.t. xˆi+1 = Axˆi +Bui (13)
h1(xˆi) ≤ 0
h2(ui) ≤ 0
for i = k, k + 1, · · · , k +N,
where ˆ˜xi := xˆi−xgoali , and Urep(Di) is the repulsive potential
function [28]. The state xi is replaced with its estimate xˆi.
Since the constraint (12c) is the safety critical constraint, we
can reformulate it as a conservative constraint such that ESC
should drive the UAV outside of the effective range of the
spoofing device with probability γ:
P(d(xˆaka+kesc , xˆka+kesc)− reffect > 0) > γ
or equivalently
d(xˆaka+kesc , xˆka+kesc)− reffect > e(Pka+kesc , P ak , γ), (14)
where Pka+kesc is the UAV state covariance at escape time,
and P ak is the attacker state covariance. The range of the
function e(·) can be seen as a robust margin to fulfill the
second constraint in (12c). Then, the hard constraint (14) is
replaced by the repulsive potential function as a high penalty
in the cost function which is active only after the escape time
ka+kesc. The repulsive potential function Urep(D) is defined
as the following:
Urep(D) :=
{
1
2β
(
1
D − 1reffect
)2
if D ≤ reffect
0 if D > reffect
,
which can be constructed based on the distance between
the location of the attacker and the location of UAV, D :=
d(xˆaka+kesc , xˆka+kesc). The scaling parameter β is a large
constant, which represents a penalty when the constraint has
not been fulfilled.
The problem (13) is a non-convex nonlinear programming
problem, which can be solved by the nonlinear program-
ming algorithms such as sequential quadratic programming
(SQP) [29], [30].
Remark 3.2: Comparing to the employments of the re-
pulsive potential function Urep in the collision avoidance
literature [31]–[33], the proposed application of the repulsive
potential function in (13) has two differences. First of all,
the repulsive potential function is known before the collision
happens in collision avoidance literature, while we can only
get the repulsive potential function Urep after the collision
happens, i.e., only after the UAV has entered the effective
range of the spoofing device. Secondly, the repulsive potential
function Urep is only counted in the cost function in (13) after
the escape time.
IV. SIMULATION
In the simulation scenario, the UAV is moving from the start
position with the coordinates at (0, 0) to the target position
(300, 300) by using feedback control2 based on the state
estimate from the state estimator in (2). When the GPS attack
happens, the state estimate will be no longer trustful. After
GPS measurement is turned off, the only available relative
state measurement causes the sensor drift problem [17]. The
UAV will switch the control mode from the robust control
mode to the emergency control mode when the attack is
detected, using ESC to escape away from the attacker within
the escape time.
2We implemented a proportional-derivative (PD) like tracking controller,
which is widely used for double integrator systems.
A. UAV Model
We use a double integrator UAV dynamics under the GPS
spoofing attack as in [34]. The discrete time state vector xk
considers planar position and velocity at time step k, i.e.
xk = [r
x
k , r
y
k , v
x
k , v
y
k ]
>,
where rxk , r
y
k denote x, y position coordinates, and v
x
k , v
y
k
denote velocity coordinates. We consider the acceleration of
UAV as the control input uk = [uxk, u
y
k]
>. We assume that
the state constraint and control input constraint are given
as
√
(vxk)
2 + (vyk)
2 ≤ 5 and √(uxk)2 + (uyk)2 ≤ 2. With
sampling time at 0.1 seconds, the double integrator model is
discretized into the following matrices:
A =

1 0 0.1 0
0 1 0 0.1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 , B =

0 0
0 0
0.1 0
0 0.1
 ,
and the outputs yGk , y
I
k and y
S
k are the position measurements
from GPS, the velocity measurements from IMU, and GPS
signal strength measurements respectively, with the output
matrices:
CG =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
, CI =
[
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
]
, CS =
[
1
]
.
The covariance matrices of the sensing and disturbance noises
are chosen as
Σw = 0.1I, ΣG = I, ΣI = 0.01I, ΣS = I.
B. Attack Signal Estimation
The GPS attack happens when the UAV is in the effective
range of the spoofing device. In this attack scenario, the attack
signal is d = [10, 10]>. The location of the attacker and the
nominal power of the spoofing device are xak = [100, 100]
>
and ηk = 200, which are both unknown to the UAV. The
estimation of the attack signal obtained by (6) is shown in
Figure 3.
Fig. 3: Attack signal estimation: UAV stays in the effective
range of the spoofing device from time step 231 to 356.
C. Attack Detection
Using the estimated attack signal to calculate the detector
state Sk by (8), the attack detector is able to detect the attack
using the normalized attack vector as shown in Figure 4. In
Figure 4, there are abnormal high detector state values, which
imply that there is an attack. Statistic significance of the attack
is tested using the CUSUM detector described in (9) with the
significance α at 1%.
Fig. 4: Attack detection: detector state S is defined in (8) of
the CUSUM detector. The threshold is calculated by
χ2df (α)
1−δ
with α = 0.01 and δ = 0.15.
D. Attacker State Estimation
When the GPS attack is detected, the UAV first estimates
the attacker state xak by using Algorithm 1. The estimation
result is shown in Figure 5. The estimated location and the
estimated nominal power quickly converge to the true values.
The estimations are drifting due to the fact that the state
estimation errors are strictly increasing and unbounded when
the UAV remains in GPS denied environment. After obtaining
the attacker state, ESC is used to escape away from the
effective range of the spoofing device.
Fig. 5: Attacker State Estimation
E. Trajectory Generation
The estimated and true trajectories of the simulated scenario
are shown in Figure 6.
Fig. 6: Estimated and true trajectories of the simulated sce-
nario. The attacker is located at (100, 100) with the effective
range reffect = 30, which is displayed as the light blue circle.
As shown in Figure 7, the state estimation error ‖xk − xˆk‖
is increasing when the UAV is in the effective range of the
spoofing device, and the error is bounded by the tolerable error
distance ζ = 3.
Fig. 7: Bounded estimation error
Figure 8 presents how the proposed control framework
performs in different cases where reffect ∈ {10, 30, 50, 70}.
Regardless of the size of reffect, the UAV will escape the
effective range within the escape time. The UAV can pass the
attacker without changing the direction or even its speed, when
the effective range of the spoofing device is small enough.
V. CONCLUSION
We present a secure safety constrained control framework
that adapts the UAV at a path re-planning level to support
resilient state estimation against GPS spoofing attacks. A
resilient state estimator has been designed and the χ2 CUSUM
algorithm is used for attack detection. In the presence of
the GPS spoofing attack, the state estimation suffers from
increasing variance due to the limited sensor availability. In
this case, using the robust controller may still keep the UAV
(a) reffect = 10 (b) reffect = 30
(c) reffect = 50 (d) reffect = 70
Fig. 8: Trajectories with different effective ranges
within the effective range of the spoofing device after the
estimation errors may not be in the tolerable region. The large
estimation error will give rise to safety problems. To solve this
safety problem, ALT is developed for tracking the attacker
location and estimating the effective range of the spoofing
device by using UKF with sliding window outputs. Then, ESC
is used to escape away from the effective range of the spoofing
device within the escape time. A UAV simulation is given to
demonstrate the results.
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APPENDIX
The current appendix presents the UKF algorithm statement
and its brief derivation for partially nonlinear systems with
sliding window outputs.
A. UKF with sliding window outputs
Consider the system:
xk+1 = Akxk + wk
yk = f(xk) + vk,
(15)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state, the output yk ∈ Rm represents
the measurement of GPS signal strength. The noise signals
wk and vk are assumed to be independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables with zero means
and covariances E[wkw>k ] = Σw′ ≥ 0 and E[vkv>k ] = Σv > 0.
Algorithm Derivation.
1) Prediction: Given the previous state estimate xˆk−1 and
system model (15), the current state can be predicted as
xˆk|k−1 = Ak−1xˆk−1.
Its error covariance matrix is
Pk|k−1 : = E[(xk − xˆk|k−1)(xk − xˆk|k−1)>]
= Ak−1Pk−1A>k−1 + Σw′ ,
where Pk−1 := E[(xk−1− xˆk−1)(xk−1− xˆk−1)>] is the state
estimation error covariance matrix.
2) Sigma Points Generation: We defined a sigma points
array
Xk := {xˆk|k−1 ± (
√
nPk|k−1)>i , i = 1, · · · , n},
where
√
nPk|k−1 is the matrix square root such that√
nPk|k−1
>√
nPk|k−1 = nPk|k−1, and the matrix operator
(·)i gives the ith row of the matrix.
3) Measurement Update: Given the sliding window size N ,
the nonlinear measurement equation f(·) is used to transform
the sigma points into predicted measurement vectors
yˆik = f(X ik)
yˆik−1 = f(A
−1
k−1X ik)
...
yˆik−N+1 = f(A
−N+1
k−1 X ik),
Algorithm 1 UKF with sliding window outputs
Prediction
1: xˆk|k−1 = Ak−1xˆk−1;
2: Pk|k−1 = Ak−1Pk−1A>k−1 + Σw′ ;
Sigma points generation
3: Xk = {xˆk|k−1 ± (
√
nPk|k−1)>i }, i ∈ {1, · · · , n};
Measurement Update
4: for i = 1 : 2n do
5:
yˆik =

yˆik
yˆik−1
...
yˆik−N+1
 =

f(X ik)
f(A−1k−1X ik)
...
f(A−N+1k−1 X ik)

6: end for
7: y¯k =
∑2n
i=0W
i
kyˆ
i
k;
8: P yk =
∑2n
i=0W
i
k(yˆ
i
k − y¯k)(yˆik − y¯k)> + Σv;
9: P xyk =
∑2n
i=0W
i
k(X ik − xˆk|k−1)(yˆik − y¯k)>;
10: Kk = P
xy
k (P
y
k)
−1
11: xˆk = xˆk|k−1 +Kk(yk − y¯k);
12: Pk = Pk|k−1 −KkP ykK>k
and we define yˆik := (yˆ
i
k, yˆ
i
k−1, · · · , yˆik−N+1)>.
The approximated mean of the measurements is defined by
y¯k :=
2n∑
i=0
W ikyˆ
i
k,
where W ik are the weighting coefficients.
By taking the measurement noises into account, the esti-
mated covariance of the predicted measurements is given by:
P yk :=
2n∑
i=0
W ik(yˆ
i
k − y¯k)(yˆik − y¯k)> + Σv,
where Σv = diag{Σv, · · · ,Σv} is the diagonal matrix.
The cross covariance between the state prediction and
predicted measurements is
P xyk =
2n∑
i=0
W ik(X ik − xˆk|k−1)(yˆik − y¯k)>,
where X ik denotes the ith element in Xk.
The measurement yk := [yk, · · · , yk−N+1]> is used to
update the propagated prediction xˆk|k−1 as xˆk = xˆk|k−1 +
Kk(yk − y¯k).
The covariance matrix of the state estimation error is
Pk = Pk|k−1 −Kk(P xyk )> − P xyk K>k +KkP ykK>k .
The gain matrix Kk is chosen by minimizing the trace norm
of Pk; i.e. minKk tr (Pk). The solution of the program is given
by
Kk = P
xy
k (P
y
k)
−1.
Note that the prediction step does not need unscented trans-
formation because the dynamic system (15) is linear.
